If we look at the historical and social presuppositions of Foucault's methodology, we find out that Nietzsche's work cannot be the only root of the shift from archaeology to genealogy. In fact, a whole range of political activist practices after May '68 until the dissolution of the Groupe d'information sur les prisons (GIP) played an important role in inciting a politicization-in-motion that clearly left its traces in Foucault's thought and work.
lect of an author or to the pure influence coming from the past, as it is the case with traditional "intellectual history". 7 If this is correct, then it would be beneficial to search for the historical context of genealogy's emergence in Foucauldian thinking and practice and not to seek for the origin of an exclusively intellectual influence or invention. For as Nietzsche put it in the very first lines of the preface of his Genealogy of Morality, "We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers: and with good reason. We have never looked for ourselves, -so how are we ever supposed to find ourselves? How right is the saying: 'Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also'; our treasure is where the hives of our knowledge are. As born winged-insects and intellectual honey-gatherers we are constantly making for them, concerned at heart with only one thing -to 'bring something home'."
8 According to Nietzsche, a self-concealment is absolutely necessary or structurally inescapable for the knowing subject, in order to attempt to know the world. 9 The knowing subjects lack the knowledge of what makes them know the way they do, just like the bees, which concentrate the honey with no self-awareness as "a symbol of patiently extracting, accumulating and concen- Foucault, 1954 Foucault, -1984 . 2: Aesthetics, p. 211. 7 See Foucault's response to a private letter in 1967 to a critique by Michel Amiot regarding The Order of Things, where he explains his ambition to take a clear distance from dominant "intellectual history": "Wishing to free history -at least the history of ideasfrom a well-worn schema where it's a matter of influence, advances, setbacks, discoveries, realizations, I sought to define the ensemble of transformations which serve as the rules of an empirical discontinuity," quoted in: Daniel Defert: Chronology, in: Christopher Falzon, Timothy O' Leary, Jana Sawicki (eds. In addition to challenging the general idea that self-awareness provides reliable self-knowledge, Nietzsche's claim addresses high-order pursuits of knowledge (Erkenntnis), including philosophy. There is something within knowers that will always be unfamiliar to them ("unfamiliar" being another meaning of unbekannt)." Thus, Nietzsche concludes the first paragraph of his preface claiming that "we remain strange to ourselves out of necessity, we do not understand ourselves, we must confusedly mistake who we are, the motto 'everyone is furthest from himself' applies to us for ever, -we are not 'knowers' when it comes to ourselves…" 10 David Burngham: The Nietzsche Dictionary, London/New York: Bloomsbury Academic 2015, p. 41.
11 Nietzsche: On the Genealogy of Morality, Preface, §1: "As far as the rest of life is concerned, the so-called 'experiences', -who of us ever has enough seriousness for them? or enough time? I fear we have never really been 'with it' in such matters: our heart is simply not in it -and not even our ear! On the contrary, like somebody divinely absent-minded and sunk in his own thoughts who, the twelve strokes of midday having just boomed into his ears, wakes with a start and wonders 'What hour struck?', sometimes we, too, afterwards rub our ears and ask, astonished, taken aback, 'What did we actually experience then?' or even, 'Who are we, in fact?' and afterwards, as I said, we count all twelve reverberating strokes of our experience, of our life, of our being -oh! and lose count . . ." We should note, at this point, that this deferred knowledge that comes only afterwards, is not an exclusive characteristic of historical knowledge, which has as its object facts that took place in the past. The delayed nature of to the disquieting claim that we need history in the form of genealogy, in order to understand by looking [inevitably, afterwards] towards the past, that "the analysis of descent permits the dissociation of Me, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events"?
12 Therefore, if we would like to know the profusion of lost events in the development of Foucault's method, we should try to historicize the accumulation and production of knowledge itself: "History becomes 'effective' to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being -as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself." 13 Consequently, it is time to ask simply and plainly: where are the beehives of Foucault's genealogy?
Foucault, GIP, and the Question of "Who is Speaking?"
The answer to this question is usually taken to be that the beehives of Foucauldian genealogy are formed exclusively through the work of Nietzschean genealogy. It is alleged to be a byproduct of mere intellectual influence and not a constellation or an assemblage of theoretical and practical circumstances and experiences in a given historical conjuncture. 14 However, a closer and a more careful look should not fail to see that besides the obvious Nietzschean inspiration there is also -at least -another one, which nourished Foucault's thought and experience after the series of events called "May '68" and during the early 1970s.
Marcelo Hoffman has aptly remarked, "Foucault's engagement with the prisoner support movement in the early 1970s has received little sustained attention outside of his biographies and a handful of articles. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the bulk of this attention has not been used to reflect more explicitly on the relationship between his theories of disciplinary power and the prison, on the one hand, and his political practices concerning the prison, on the other 29 Mao is mentioned and discussed by Foucault even 10 years later in the 1979-80 lectures entitled On the Government of the Living -even though he is omitted from the Name Index compiled by the editors. See the fifth lecture (6 February 1980), where Foucault discusses the three matrices of moral thought in West: the models of two ways, the fall, and the stain. In the penultimate paragraph of the lecture (p. 108), he states clearly that "after all, with Marxism it's the same thing. You have the model of the fall, alienation and dis-alienation. You have the model of the two ways: Mao Zedong. And you have, of course, the problem of the stain of those who are originally soiled and must be purified: Stalinism. Marx, Mao, Stalin; the three models, of the two ways, the fall, and the stain." Marx's and Stalin's names were equally omitted from the Name Index, while R. The whole question regarding "who is speaking?" was crucial from early 1960s inside universities not only for students, but also for young lower-ranking instructors, since in France there was a noteworthy increase in the numbers of university professors. 34 There were also crucial gender dimensions to the question of "who is speaking?," as in France "only 6 percent of students were female in 1906, jumping to 33 percent in 1950, 42 percent in 1962, and nearly 50 percent in 1965-66." 35 Foucault, playing the Nietzschean role of the bee that accumulates the honey of knowledge, ignored the significant political and social repercussions of this historical development, and in January 1968, after a meeting he had with students at the University of Nanterre, the bastion of the forthcoming eruption of student's movement, he commented to Defert that it was strange "how these students speak about their relations with their professors in terms of class struggle." 36 On the other hand, Foucault was trying hard to remove the glued honey from his fingers and his privileged position as a knowing subject by being not only ready but also eager to experience and know things anew through "inventing forms of speech in public spaces"; being "an enduring critic of his own thought." 37 Foucault, 1954 Foucault, -1984 The Order of Things, p. xix: "Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy 'syntax' in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to 'hold together'. This is why utopias permit fables and discourse: they run with the very grain of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the fabula; heterotopias (such as those to be found so often in Borges) desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences. press conferences took place during the years 1971-72, while Foucault was politically active with the GIP. Firstly, on 8 February 1971, at the inaugural appearance of GIP, Foucault "attended the press-conference not to appropriate or co-opt it, but to prolong it. He did not use it as an exhibition space, or a space in which to make a statement, but as an opportunity to draw attention. He stated that an investigation had been launched in the prisons to determine what has happened, who was there, and so on.
[…] The person speaking did not state any truth, he questioned the evidence." Secondly, on 21 June 1971, during a press conference regarding the Jaubert Affair, Foucault and the other speakers, Claude Mauriac, Denis Langlois, and Gilles Deleuze, spoke as witnesses of the incident, in order to counter, through a collective speech, the misinformation campaign launched by police and French Government. Finally, on 17 February 1972, during a press conference that was held at the ministry of Justice on the Place Vendôme in Paris, Foucault spoke, in order to read "aloud from a text written by the inmates of Melun prison. In other words, in the very space where the law is decreed, the ministry of justice, the philosopher gave a voice to those who until then had been deprived of the power of the speech.
He did not speak on their behalf or for them, he served as a transmitter." factories and were related with the working class. 50 Given that GIP was created due to the fact that GP militants were already -though involuntarily -établis inside prisons as inmates due to the proscription of GP by ministerial decree in May 1970, it is commonly accepted that there was no need to exercise the practice of établissement.
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David Macey claims that when Foucault was at the head of the department of philosophy in Vincennes, he "did not subscribe to the mythology of the établi, and spoke disapprovingly to Defert about the move into the factories, arguing that May would have had much fartherreaching effects in the sphere of knowledge if the struggle had been concentrated on the universities. He had no interest in arcane interpretations of Lenin. Nor did he share the contemporary enthusiasm for studying the 'Mao Tse-Tung thought', an activity which he regarded as quite meaningless." 52 However, we should notice that in the case of GIP a different kind of établisse-ment was needed, since Foucault insisted that a different move was essential in order to form an alliance between the Maoists and prisoners. Namely, it was absolutely crucial that the militants not only continue their struggle aiming only at the recognition and the acquisition of the status of "political prisoner" as distinct from "common criminals," but also at blurring the distinction between good and evil and putting into question the very act of punishment. For, according to Foucault, the main political problem was not the recognition of the division between political and common crimes, but "the definition of the implicit systems in which we find our- https://viewpointmag.com/2013/09/25/the-intolerable-inquiry-the-documents-of-the-groupe-dinformation-sur-les-prisons. 55 Defert described very well the dead-end of the traditional methods of thought and practice in a context that was totally unknown for the militants that participated as students in May '68: "May 68 had bypassed the prisons -and Parliament, as it happens -as though such places did not symbolize forms of power. I remember that I later read the diary of a prisoner in La Santé in Paris. The entry for one of the most turbulent days of May '68 was simply: 'Saw a rat today.' There was worse news to come: some prisoners told us that they had been afraid, or that the guards -the 'screws' as the GIP now referred to them in the media -had made them afraid, that the revolutionaries would win, and thus confirmed the old Marxist prejudice against the of its [GIP] interventions was not to extend the visiting rights of prisoners to thirty minutes or to procure flush toilets for the cells, but to question the social and moral distinction between the innocent and the guilty."
56 Consequently, Maoist militants should re-examine their faith and their unconscious attachment to the dominant criteria of social and moral distinction between good and evil. As he asserted more openly after his visit to Attica Prison in the U.S., "when Mao-
ists were jailed, we should say, that they began to react in a similar way with the traditional political groups […] . This was, I think, a political error that was quickly perceived; there were discussions on the subject, and at this very moment our group was founded; the Maoists soon realized that in the end the exclusion imposed by prison to the common law prisoners are a part of the political system of elimination of which they were victims themselves." He continued remarking that a real cultural revolution -alluding to the Chinese Cultural Revolution -should make no distinction between "political" and "common criminals" and concluded thusly: "I believe that in this occasion their perception of things was much refined, as they discovered that deep down not only the ensemble of the penal system but also the ensemble of the moral sys- This tool enabled the GIP to contest the very same historical and social process of divisiontherefore it instituted a new practice of établissement, no longer based a priori on the dichotomy between revolutionary and the masses, between political and common criminals, but rather on the critical analysis of the historical and social continuity between them. Thus, given that this historical and social continuity is a relation constantly and immanently constituted historically, a few years later, on 22 May 1980, Foucault tried to take a distance from his previous analysis regarding sub-proletariat commenting on the changes and transformations that were taking place in modern capitalist societies during the 1970s: "The tension between the so-called proletariat and the so-called sub-proletariat clearly characterized the end of the nineteenth century. I am not sure that the proletariat or the sub-proletariat exist.
[…] But I think that this opposition is currently eroding. What separated the proletariat from the sub-proletariat is that some were working and others were not. This boundary is threatened with extinction by the expansion of unemployment. This is probably why these somewhat marginal, quasi folkloric themes like sexuality have become more general problems." ly a revolutionary ideology." 63 The basis of the mutual incomprehension between the leaders of GP and GIP is the latter's insistence that the historical function of a court is that of a social and political apparatus and not that of an ideological mechanism. As Foucault maintained, forecasting his analysis of the diagrams of power in Discipline and Punish and beginning to take a distance from Chinese Revolution, "are you certain that it is merely the form of the court that is involved here? I do not know how these things are done in China, but look a bit more closely at the meaning of the spatial arrangement of the court, the arrangement of the people who are part of or before a court. The very least that can be said is that this implies an ideology. What is this arrangement? A table, and behind this table, which distances them from the two litigants, the 'third party', that is, the judges." It would be interesting to try to see how a subject came to be constituted that is not definitely
given, that is not the thing on the basis of which truth happens to history -rather, a subject that constitutes itself within history and is constantly established and reestablished by history. It is toward that radical critique of the human subject by history that we should direct our efforts. A certain university or academic tradition of Marxism has not yet given up the traditional philosophical conception of the subject." Foucault, 1954 Foucault, -1984 : Power, p. 3.
Even earlier, on 21st February 1973 in his lecture at Collège Foucault undermines and criticizes the Marxist/leftist rhetoric concerning the revolutionary subject of politics and history claiming plainly: "Now I am not sure I am right in using the term 'seditious mobs' (plebeséditieuse). Actually it seems to me that the mechanism that brought about the formation of the punitive system is, in a sense, deeper and broader than that of the simple control of the seditious mobs. ogy'. Now this role of referee, judge and universal witness is one which I absolutely refuse to adopt, because it seems to me to be tied up with philosophy as a university institution. French 1997 ], p. 6. Or in pp. 9-10: "To put it in more specific terms, or at least in terms that might mean more to you, let me say this: you know how many people have been asking themselves whether or not Marxism is a science for many years now, probably for more than a century. One might say that the same question has been asked, and is still being asked, of psychoanalysis or, worse still, of the semiology of literary texts. Genealogies' or genealogists' answer to the question 'Is it a science or not?' is: 'Turning Marxism, or psychoanalysis, or whatever else it is, into a science is precisely what we are criticizing you for. And if there is one objection to be made against Marxism, it ' s that it might well be a science' ." Or, during a discussion after a lecture he delivered in 1976 at Brazil, Foucault attacks again to the academic version of Marxism, but he recognizes Marx as someone that cannot be reduced to Marxism: "Once again, here a particular version of academic Marxism frequently uses the opposition of dominant class versus dominated class, the dominant discourse versus the dominated discourse. And yet we will never find this dualism in Marx; however, it can be found in reactionary and racist thinkers like Gobineau, who maintains that, within society, there are always two classes, a dominated and another who dominates. You can find this in many places, but never in Marx, because, in fact, Marx is too cunning to maintain something like this; he knew perfectly well that what strengthens relationships of power is that they never stop; there is not some single relationship of power here, and many over there; they course throughout everything: the working class retransmits relationships of power; it makes use of relationships of power." See 72 Foucault characterizes from the very first lecture the notion of "class justice" -the central and basic concept of Maoists -as "general and fairly dubious".
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Moreover, he analyzes how, in the history of the West, the discourse of war, during the eighteenth century, was conceived as a war of races and played a constitutive and not a destructive role in the process of the formation of the modern state and its mechanisms. 74 Foucault also the State has been transformed, since instead of being the instrument of one social group against the other it is the protector of the race -shortly, that the modern capitalist societies are "characterized by the fact that the theme of historical war -with its battles, its invasions, its looting, its victories, and its defeats -will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the For no leftist is willing to countersign the warning that "the man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body." 78 The resonance with Nietzsche is unmistakable: "First, one has the difficulty of emancipating oneself from one's chains;
and, ultimately, one has to emancipate oneself from this emancipation too! Each of us has to suffer, though in greatly differing ways, from the chain sickness, even after he has broken the chains." 79 For no leftist is willing to countersign the methodological precaution, articulated in the 1975-76 lectures, that demands an ascending analysis of power, according to which, "the notion of 'bourgeoisie' and of the 'interests of bourgeoisie' have no content." And Foucault continues provocatively: "The bourgeoisie is not interested in the mad, but it is interested in power over the mad; the bourgeoisie is not interested in the sexuality of children, but it is interested in the system of power that controls the sexuality of children. The bourgeoisie does not give a damn about delinquents, or about how they are punished or rehabilitated, as that is of no great economic interest. On the other hand, the set of mechanisms whereby delinquents are controlled, kept track of, punished, and reformed does generate a bourgeois interest that functions within the economicopolitical system as a whole." 80 What made this diversion possible? Maybe a genealogical answer is hiding under Seidman's description of the historical development of 76 Ibid., pp. 80-81: "It is no longer a battle in the sense that a warrior would understand the term, but a struggle in the biological sense: the differentiation of species, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest species. Similarly, the theme of the binary society which is divided into two races or two groups with different languages, laws, and soon will be replaced by that of a society that is, in contrast, biologically monist. Its only problem is this: it is threatened by a certain number of heterogeneous elements which are not essential to it, which do not divide the social body, or the living body of society, into two parts, and which are in a sense accidental. Hence the idea that foreigners have infiltrated this society, the theme of the deviants who are this society's by products. The theme of the counter history of races was, finally, that the State was necessarily unjust. It is now inverted into its opposite: the State is no longer an instrument that one race uses against another: the State is, and must be, the protector of the integrity, the superiority, and the purity of the race. of Cahiers pour Analyse, published just after May (summer 1968). In the editorial, they reproached Foucauldian archaeology for being the "opposite of sciences" and declared that "Genealogy here serves as a reminder of this forgotten lineage, in keeping with an inscription that is sufficiently neutral so as to annul the difference between the archaeologist and the historian." 84 Foucault published an answer, which is a sketch of ideas that later became the introduction to
The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969) .
In this text Foucault seems to move methodologically, as he moves politically, towards an analysis not of discourse as a linguistic entity, but to discourse as an event: "In short, it is a matter of the discourse in the system of its institutionalization. I shall call an archive, not the totality of texts that have been preserved by a civilization or the set of traces that could be salvaged from its downfall, but the series of rules which determine in a culture the appearance and disappearance of statements, their retention and their destruction, their paradoxical existence as events and things. To analyze the facts of discourse in the general element of the archive is to consider them, not at all as documents (of a concealed significance or a rule of construction), but as monuments." 85 As Colin Koopman aptly suggests, "if we can keep our ear to his methodology, as well as his subject matter," we could "attune ourselves to the jolting reverberations of politicization-in-motion." 86 This text is, perhaps, Foucault's first unmediated contact and exchange with
